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ABSTRACT
How should we reconfigure the relationship between memory and history as two 
distinguishable yet interconnected epistemological routes to knowing the past? 
This article seeks some conceptual clarity on the intricate and complex interrelation 
between memory and history, also in conversation with some questions that arise 
from contexts associated with historical injustice. With this purpose in mind, the 
article engages especially the later work of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. 
Ricoeur’s response to the memory-history problem is not to view memory and 
history as adversaries, but to view them as conjoined and complementary as 
we grapple with the past and the temporality of our own lives. In light of this 
affirmation of the dialectical relationship between memory and history, the article 
further emphasises some aspects that are important to consider in the search for a 
responsible historical hermeneutic. 
INTRODUCTION: MEMORY, HISTORY AND JUSTICE
In the “Preface” to his monumental work Memory, History, Forgetting the French Philosopher 
Paul Ricoeur writes that this book grew out of some private, some professional and some public 
preoccupations. Under the rubric of “professional consideration” he refers to the fact that this 
book is a prolongation of an uninterrupted conversation with professional historians who have 
been “confronting the same problems regarding the ties between memory and history.”3 
The ties that bind history and memory – these two ways of retrospection, of looking at or 
engaging the past – indeed raise some serious and challenging problems and questions. Without 
doubt the relationship is complex, given (among other things) the fact that both “memory” and 
“history” have multiple senses. Therefore one needs to give at least some indication of what one 
means when using these terms, albeit that one should also recognise their conceptual fluidity. In 
addition, one should affirm the boundaries and the interconnectedness between memory and 
history. Memory and history are not to be conflated in our discourse and practice, although they 
overlap in some significant ways. Geoffrey Cubitt puts it well in his book History and Memory:
1  Department of Systematic Theology and Ethics, Faculty of Theology, University of Stellenbosch. E-mail: 
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2  This article is dedicated to Prof. Vincent Brümmer in celebration of his 80th birthday. I first met Prof. 
Brümmer in 1992 when I attended his doctoral seminars as a student in Utrecht, and I remember vividly 
his emphasis on the need to be clear and coherent in one’s reasoning. One can rightly say that his own 
impressive and influential oeuvre exemplifies the search for conceptual clarity, for the sake of love 
and life. A first draft of this paper was read at an international conference on “Memory and Historical 
Injustice” in Melbourne, Australia in February 2012.
3  Ricoeur, P 2004, Memory, History, Forgetting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), xv. For the original 
French text, see Ricoeur, P 2000. La Mémoire, Lhistoire, Loubli (Paris: Éditions du Seuil). 
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“History and memory are proximate concepts: they inhabit a similar mental territory … (W)e 
can see them as conceptual terms that have constantly interacted with each other, moving 
in and out of each other, circling each other warily or amorously, sometimes embracing, 
sometimes separating, sometimes jostling for position on the discursive terrain that is their 
common habitat.”4
Given the fact that memory and history are connected concepts, and that there is often tension 
and even conflict between these two ways of knowing the past, it is not easy to conceptualise 
the relationship between memory and history. The difficulties involved in reflecting on the ties 
that bind memory and history have not discouraged scholars from venturing into this slippery 
terrain, though, and it has been said that “(f)ew topics in recent years have elicited as much 
interest among historians as the relationship between memory and history.”5 The so-called 
“turn to memory” in historical scholarship (a turn that is noticeable across academic disciplines, 
making memory studies “a peculiarly busy interdisciplinary arena”6) has emphasised the need to 
gain greater clarity on the close but complex relationship between memory and history. 
This article seeks some conceptual clarity on this intricate interrelation between memory 
and history, also in conversation with some questions that arise from contexts associated with 
historical injustice. With this purpose in mind, the article engages especially the later work of 
Paul Ricoeur, albeit that there is much to be gained from positioning Ricoeur’s reflections on 
memory and history against the backdrop of his philosophical project as a whole.
In the preface to Memory, History, Forgetting Ricoeur mentions another, more public, 
preoccupation that has informed this book:
“I continued to be troubled by the unsettling spectacle offered by an excess of 
memory here, and an excess of forgetting elsewhere, to say nothing of the influence of 
commemorations and abuses of memory – and of forgetting. The idea of a policy of the just 
allotment of memory is in this respect one of my avowed civic themes.”7
The concern for the “just allotment of memory” is also shared by those who want to reflect 
responsibly on South Africa’s apartheid past. Discussions on memory and history – and their 
interrelation – do not occur in a historical vacuum and they become especially poignant in 
contexts saturated with narratives of historical injustice. The work of the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission offers a fitting example to consider in this regard. If one wants 
knowledge of the work of the Commission one can turn to the official report (published in seven 
volumes or on official websites). This report is and will be, without doubt, an important and in 
many ways indispensable source for historians who want to embark on some or other kind of 
historiographical project connected to South Africa’s apartheid past. There are of course many 
traumatic memories and painful stories not included in the official report. Furthermore, the 
written or recorded sources that have found their way into the “archive” are not to be equated 
with the testimonies themselves or the events these testimonies point to. While the value of 
documents such as the official report can hardly be overstated, it is nevertheless important 
not to limit the work and legacy of the Truth Commission to the “documented history,” just as 
South Africa’s apartheid history cannot be viewed only through the lens of the official Truth 
Commission report. For a responsible historical engagement with South Africa’s apartheid past, 
a careful and critical interaction with documented history is extremely important. However, 
there are many memories not represented (or even misrepresented) in these sources. Hence 
4  Cubitt, G, 2007, History and Memory (Manchester: Manchester University Press), 4, 5. 
5  Hutton, P 2000, “Recent Scholarship on Memory and History,” The History Teacher 33/4: 533-548, 533. 
Cf. Gardner, P 2010, Hermeneutics, History and Memory (London: Routledge), 90. 
6  Cf. Cubit, History and Memory, 4.
7  Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, xv.
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the need for, and value of, oral history projects. In both documented and oral history, moreover, 
questions (often implicit questions) regarding the relationship between memory and history 
keep on coming to the fore.
One of the interesting more recent reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
is the book entitled There was this Goat: Investigating the Truth Commission Testimony of 
Notrose Nobomvu Konile by Antjie Krog, Nosisi Mpolweni and Kopana Ratele. This book offers an 
illuminating engagement with the testimony of Notrose Konile, the mother of Zabonke Konile, 
who was killed in what came to be known as the Gugulethu Seven incident. Antjie Krog, well known 
for her haunting observations as reporter on the work of the Truth Commission reflected in her 
book Country of My Skull (1998), attended the hearing of Konile on 23 April 1996 and was struck 
by her seemingly incoherent testimony. The details do not concern us directly here, although I 
can mention that the title of the book is taken from a part of Notrose Konile’s testimony, which 
was recorded as follows: “I had a very – a very scary period, there was this – this goat looking 
up, this one next to me said oh! having a dream like that with a goat looking at you is a very bad 
dream.”8 Years later Krog revisited this testimony with two colleagues from the University of the 
Western Cape, Nosisi Mpolweni and Kopano Ratele, who were then lecturers in the Xhosa and 
Psychology Departments respectively. They met regularly to discuss Konile’s testimony and it 
became clear to them that the testimony in the official report is incomprehensible as it stands, 
and in order to make sense of it, you need to make use of indigenous language and knowledge 
systems. By tirelessly exploring the gaps and inconsistencies in Konile’s testimony, and drawing 
on their respective disciplines, Krog, Mpolweni and Ratele indicate how a greater understanding 
of language and cultural contexts can challenge stereotypes and reductions. They observe: “As 
there were slippages in the interpretation of Mrs Konile’s testimony, the valuable information 
with regard to her feelings and aspirations could not reach many of the Truth Commission officials 
and the audience. Slippages in translation can lead to misinterpretation and misrepresentation 
of a testifier, while intimate cultural knowledge can lead to a fuller and more just interpretation 
of a mother-tongue testimony that could restore the dignity of the testifier.”9 
I briefly recall this book because it offers a powerful reminder that one should guard against 
views that overestimate the ability of documented historical sources to represent the past. This 
is not to say that documents and written sources are not extremely important for historical 
investigation, but the inherent vulnerability of the archive should be acknowledged. But does 
this mean that we should rather privilege memory as a more reliable way of gaining knowledge 
of the past? Can one privilege memory over above history or is these two intentions of the past, 
to follow Ricoeur’s position, undecidable.”10 And if so, for what reasons? 
MEMORY OR HISTORY?
Before entering into a more detailed engagement with Ricoeur’s thoughts on memory and 
history, it might be worthwhile to bring the differences, overlaps and tensions between memory 
and history sharper into focus. David Lowenthal comments helpfully in this regard:
“Memory and history are processes of insight; each involves components of the other, 
and their boundaries are shadowy. Yet memory and history are normally and justifiably 
distinguished: memory is inescapably and prima-facie indubitable; history is contingent and 
empirically testable.”11
8  Antjie Krog, Nosisi Mpolweni and Kopana Ratele, There was this goat: Investigating the Truth 
Commission Testimony of Notrose Nobomvu Konile (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 
2009), 13.
9  Krog, Mpolweni and Ratele, There was this goat, 55.
10  Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 385.
11  Lowenthal, D 1985, The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 187.
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Memory and history thus point to two distinguishable yet interconnected epistemological routes 
to knowing the past.12 History is based on empirical sources in a more direct way, although 
memory is shaped by accounts of the past by others (that is “history”). In a similar vein, history 
relies on eyewitnesses and their testimony (that is “memory”). Despite the connections and 
overlaps, the world of memory appears quite different from the world of history. 
Philip Gardner uses some vivid images to describe these different worlds. He links the world 
of memory to the brightness of day in which we move around in an assured way because we can 
see our surrounding (although we may makes mistakes in what we believe we have seen). The 
world of history is different, since the sun has already set, and to navigate this dark space we 
need artificial light as a substitute for the sun. We must therefore look elsewhere for illumination, 
“to the archive, to the documents of history, without which the events that happened before our 
time would remain unlighted.”13 Gardner not only views the movement from history to memory 
in terms of the metaphor of “light”, but also views it as a question of distance and scale. Whereas 
history has to bridge the distance, difference and dislocation between present and past, the 
past and the present are already more intimately connected in the case of memory, with the 
agency of the individual playing a central role. In addition to describing the difference between 
memory and history in terms of images of light and distance, Gardner refers to the movement 
from history to memory as a movement from silence to sound: “In terms of sources it takes us 
from the document to the voice. In terms of method, it takes us from reading to listening.”14 
One might refine Gardner’s description of the differences between the world of memory 
and the world of history, but his discussion is helpful to emphasise that we are dealing with 
two distinct ways of representing the past. Other features of the difference between memory 
and history can be added. Alan Megill, for instance, has argued that memory – however one 
defines it – has the character of being “immediate” and that we do not have adequate grounds 
for challenging what somebody remembers, while history, on the other hand, is different 
since it brings evidence into play.15 For Megill the blurring of history and memory is therefore 
deeply problematic, and the task of the historian “ought to be less to preserve memory than 
to overcome it or at least to keep it confined.”16 Attempts not to conflate history and memory 
and to respect their boundaries are certainly helpful. But, on the other hand, it also seems 
problematic to cast memory and history in two opposing camps, the one being private, passive, 
subjective and value-related, and the other public, active, objective and fact-based. Over against 
these dichotomies and antinomies one can also point to the fact that Ralph Samuel has rightly 
argued “that memory, so far from being merely a passive receptacle or storage system, an image 
bank of the past, is rather an active shaping force … and that it is dialectically related to historical 
thought, rather than some kind of negative other to it.”17 
In the discourse on memory and history and their relation a certain tension is often 
highlighted. From the side of those who privilege memory over history, “history” is viewed as 
pretending to make value-free objective claims about the past that do not do justice to particular 
12  Lowenthal rightfully reminds us: “‘Knowing the past,’ as Kubler says, ‘is as astonishing a performance 
as knowing the stars’; and it remains no less elusive for being well documented” (The Past is a Foreign 
Country, 191). 
13  Gardner, Hermeneutics, History and Memory, 89.
14  Gardner, Hermeneutics, History and Memory, 90.
15  Megill, A 2007. Historical Knowledge, Historical Error (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 22.
16  Megill, Historical Knowledge, 37. Megill therefore argues that a critical historiography, although it is 
informed by memory, has to stand at a distance from memory: “In short: history both needs memory and 
needs to go beyond memory” (Historical Knowledge, 40).
17  Samuel, R 1994, Theatres of Memory, Volume 1: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture (London: 
Verso), x.
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memories and identities. Those who privilege history over above memory are, in turn, sceptical 
of the way in which memory in their view functions in an arbitrary way without means to check 
its validity. In short, history seems to be vulnerable to questions of identity, while memory seems 
to be vulnerable to questions concerning truth claims. Gardner states the matter succinctly:
“If memory settles upon identity, it opens itself to the perils of wilful manipulation or 
organized forgetting. If history settles only upon its own claims to truth, it closes its eyes 
to its own boundedness. If history deprecates memory, it lays waste to its wellspring. If 
memory ignores history, it squanders its credibility.”18
The dialectic between memory and history therefore remains, and a responsible engagement 
with the past is probably best served by allowing space for this tension to be creative and 
constructive, viewing both modes of retrospection with suspicion and trust. In conversation 
with Ricoeur, this article explores further why one cannot decide which one of these two 
epistemological routes to the past has priority. Ricoeur’s response to the memory-history 
problem is not to view memory and history as adversaries, but to view them as conjoined and 
complementary as we grapple with the past and the temporality of our own lives.19 With this in 
mind, we now turn more directly to Ricoeur’s thought.
RICOEUR ON MEMORY AND HISTORY
Memory, History, Forgetting presents Ricoeur’s mature thought on memory and history, and their 
dialectical relationship. However, the concerns of this book are not new, since – as Ricoeur has 
noted in his “intellectual autobiography” – much of his previous work is marked by a concern for 
“a sense of history.”20 The strong continuity between the themes that announce themselves in 
Memory, History, Forgetting and Ricoeur’s earlier work should thus be noted, and it is profitable 
to read this book against the backdrop of his whole philosophical oeuvre. 
Our concern in this paper is not to give a detailed discussion of Ricoeur’s extensive discussion 
of the themes of memory, history and forgetting. The main argument is rather that Ricoeur’s 
thought is valuable to keep the necessary tension between memory and history creative, as well 
as to view both memory and history – as two distinct but interconnected modes of representing 
the past – with suspicion and trust. However, before turning to these matters, it might be 
valuable to represent in very broad strokes something of the main intention and argument of 
Memory, History, Forgetting.
In Memory, History, Forgetting Ricoeur grapples by way of an innovative framework and 
extensive discussions of the relevant literature with questions relating to the importance of 
– and difficulties associated with – the quest for the representation of the past.21 Although 
18  Gardner, Hermeneutics, History and Memory, 115.
19  Cf. Gardner, Hermeneutics, History and Memory, 97.
20  Ricoeur observes: “Of course, the question of history comes up as early as 1949 in ‘Husserl and the 
Sense of History’; the same question also returns in other guises: the status proper to the history of 
philosophy, objectivity and subjectivity in history, the sense of history in general, the place of violence 
and non-violence in history, the sense of history and Christian eschatology, progress, ambiguity, hope, 
and so forth. The first collection of my articles, History and Truth, bears the mark of this constant concern 
for the ‘sense of history.’” See Hahn, L E 1995, The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Chicago: Open Court), 
39. And in the third volume of Time and Narrative, we can add, Ricoeur deals extensively with the way 
in which history and fiction, when taken together, offer the reply of a poetics of narrative to the aporias 
of time. Cf. Ricoeur, P 1988, Time and Narrative, volume 3 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 
99-240. For corresponding material, see Ricoeur, P 1984, The Reality of the Historical Past (The Aquinas 
Lecture, 1984) (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press). 
21  Just before the table of contents in Memory, History, Forgetting there is a picture of a baroque bronze 
http://ngtt.journals.ac.za
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this book resists easy summary, the broad argument of the book is presented in three clearly 
defined, but interlinked, parts. The first part of the book is, as the title suggests, devoted to a 
discussion of memory. Ricoeur’s phenomenology of memory begins with an analysis of the object 
of memory (le souvenir) and goes on to deal with a given memory (anamnesis, recollection). The 
discussion then moves to memory as it is exercised (reflective memory), with reference to the 
use and abuse of memory. This section also includes a discussion of individual and collective 
memory. The second part of the book can be viewed as an epistemology of history. Here Ricoeur 
discusses the three phases of the historical operation: the stage of testimony and the archives 
(the documentary phase); the phase of explanation and understanding; and the historian’s 
representation of the past on a scriptural level (the representative phase). Throughout this 
discussion Ricoeur is interested in the historian’s intention to produce a truthful reconstruction 
of the past. The third part of the book is framed within a hermeneutics of the historical condition. 
In this section Ricoeur argues for a critical philosophy of history that is “attentive to the limits 
of historical knowledge that a certain hubris of historical science transgresses time and time 
again.”22 In addition, this section contains a meditation on forgetting. The epilogue of the book 
deals with what Ricoeur terms “difficult forgiveness.” Although Memory, History, Forgetting has 
– apart from the epilogue – three clearly distinguishable sections, Ricoeur emphasises that the 
sections do not constitute three separate books, but can be seen instead as three masts with 
interlocking but distinct sails that belong to the same ship setting off on a single itinerary. There 
is a common concern that “flows through the phenomenology of memory, the epistemology of 
history, and the hermeneutics of the social condition: the problematic of the representation of 
the past.”23
Given the focus of this paper on the dialectical relationship between memory and history, 
it is worthwhile to attend briefly to Ricoeur’s discussion of this matter in a chapter on “History 
and Time” in the third section (on “The Historical Condition”) of Memory, History, Forgetting. As 
already mentioned, Ricoeur argues that one cannot give priority to either memory or history. In 
the process he considers what he views as two intersecting and competing developments. On 
the one hand, there is the claim to dissolve the field of memory into history (which includes the 
development of a history of memory). On the other hand, there is the attempt of memory to 
historicise itself. Therefore Ricoeur is concerned with two questions, namely “Is Memory just a 
province of history? “ and “Is Memory in charge of history?”24 Ricoeur implicitly answers both 
sculpture from the Wiblingen monastery in Ulm, Germany (it is also used on the cover of the French 
text). The heart of the problem and argument presented in Memory, History, Forgetting is well captured in 
this thought-provoking sculpture. Ricoeur offers a commentary in an adjacent note: “It is the dual figure 
of history. In the foreground, Kronos, the winged god. An old man with wreathed brow: his left hand 
grips a large book, his right hand attempts to tear out a page. Behind and above, stands history itself. The 
gaze is grave and searching; one foot topples a horn of plenty from which spills the cascade of gold and 
silver, sign of instability; the left hand checks the act of the god, while the right hand displays history’s 
instruments: the book, the inkpot, and the stylus.” Ricoeur does not interpret this sculpture in more 
detail, but one can argue that Kronos as an old man represents the fleeing of time into the past. History, 
the other figure in the sculpture, holds the instruments for conquering time. With the passing of time, the 
past moves into oblivion and becomes, on a fundamental level, inaccessible to us. Nevertheless, we try to 
gain access to the past and interpret it, which is made possible by the fact that traces remain in memory. 
Through the writing, recording and reading of history, we try to represent – to make present again – the 
past by attending to these traces. It is between the fallible power of memory and the force of forgetfulness 
that Ricoeur places his critical philosophy of history/historiography.
22  Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, xvi.
23  Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, xvi.
24  See Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 385-392. In dealing with the question “Memory, just a 
province of history?” Ricoeur mainly engages with an essay by Krzysztof Pomian entitled “De l’histoire, 
http://ngtt.journals.ac.za
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questions, as can be expected, in the negative. The unending debates between the rival claims 
of history and memory need not, however, end in a paralysing aporia. Therefore Ricoeur writes:
“the history of memory and the historicization of memory can confront one another in an 
open dialectic that preserves them from the passage to the limit, from that hubris, that 
would result from, on the one hand, history’s claim to reduce memory to the level of one of 
its objects, and on the other hand, the claim of collective memory to subjugate history by 
means of the abuses of memory that the commemorations imposed by political powers or 
by pressure groups can turn into.”25
This quotation makes Ricoeur’s intentions clear. The hubris of history (that reduces memory 
to one of its objects) should be countered. On the other hand, the abuses of memory – the 
danger of too much memory – should be kept at bay. This requires prudent consciousness, a 
prudence that respects, among other things, what Ricoeur calls “the uncanniness of history.”26
TOWARDS A RESPONSIBLE HISTORICAL HERMENEUTIC?
It is clear from the brief discussion above that Ricoeur affirms the need to maintain the dialectical 
relationship between memory and history. For Ricoeur memory is the matrix of history, and 
as such one cannot conceive of history without memory. This is not say that history is merely 
an extension of memory, but the stance that memory and history are antithetical should be 
rejected. In addition, the way in which history as a mode of responsible retrospection can police 
the abuse of memory ought to receive due emphasis. 
In the Introduction to this article brief reference was made to some of the challenges involved 
for an historical engagement with South Africa’s apartheid past, and the role of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission as one response to the reality of historical injustice in South Africa. 
For the historian working on these themes both documented and oral sources are important and 
this implies the need for some understanding of the complementary and conflicting relationship 
between memory and history. On a methodological level the nuanced work of Ricoeur provides 
valuable conceptual clarity in order to address these challenges in a responsible manner. In this 
section of the article I would like to limit the discussion to two aspects – much more can and 
should be said – that are especially pertinent en route to a responsible historical epistemology 
and hermeneutic in dealing with the past in contexts marked by conflict, violence and historical 
injustice, as well as by the concomitant search for reconciliation, truth and justice. 
A first aspect relates to the need to emphasise the vulnerability of memory (while at the same, 
paradoxically, affirming the capability of memory). A second aspect relates to the importance 
of underlining the reality of the historical past through a careful historical or historiographical 
operation (while at the same time highlighting the mystery or strangeness of the past in the light 
of our historical condition).
The vulnerability of memory
The fact that memory plays an important role in the historical process is uncontested. The 
value of the plea for (collective) memory – made by scholars such as Maurice Halbwachs, Yosef 
partie de la mémoire, à la mémoire, objet d’histoire,” while his main conversation partner in dealing with 
the question “Memory, in charge of history?” is the literary critic Richard Terdiman. 
25  Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 392, 392. 
26  Cf. Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 393. Under the heading of “The Uncanniness of History” 
Ricoeur adopts Freud’s notion of Unheimlichkeit in his discussion of the influential work of Maurice 
Halbwachs, Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi and Pierre Nora. Ricoeur concludes his informative discussion by 
saying that “the ‘uncanniness’ of history prevails, even as it attempts to understand the reasons why it is 
contested by commemorative memory” (Memory, History, Forgetting, 411).
http://ngtt.journals.ac.za
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Yerushalmi, and Pierre Nora – as a challenge to reductive understandings of historiography 
can hardly be overestimated. But we should also keep in mind that memory is a slippery and 
ambiguous notion. Even a committed advocate for memory such as Yosef Yerushalmi writes at 
the start of his justly acclaimed book Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory: “Memory is 
always problematic, usually deceptive, sometimes treacherous … We ourselves are periodically 
aware that memory is among the most fragile and capricious of our faculties.”27 Memory is 
indeed at once fragile and potent. The ambivalent potential of memory – also for contexts 
associated with the public legitimisation of historical injustice – should be noted, for, as W. James 
Booth perceptively observes, “Memory has fuelled merciless violent strife, and it has been at the 
core of reconciliation and reconstruction. It has been used to justify great crimes, and yet it is 
central to the pursuit of justice.”28
Ricoeur too is deeply aware of what he refers to as the vulnerability of memory, acknowledging 
in the process the possible abuses of memory. According to Ricoeur, the abuses of natural 
memory29 occur on three levels, namely the pathological, therapeutic level (referred to by 
Ricoeur as “blocked memory”), the practical level (described as “manipulated memory”) and 
the ethico-political level (termed “obligated memory”). 
On the therapeutic level Ricoeur refers to the vulnerability of memory in the light of what 
he calls wounded or even sick memory, linking blocked memory to words like “traumatism,” 
“wound,” “scar” etc. Ricoeur’s discussion here – which engages two of Freud’s influential essays, 
namely “Erinnern, Wiederholen, Durcharbeiten” (“Remembering, Repeating, and Working-
Through”) and “Trauer und Melancholie” (“Mourning and Melancholia”) – is worth considering 
in the important discourse that brings memory into conversation with notions such as “trauma,” 
“narrative” and “forgiveness.” In lives and communities scarred by violence and injustice, the 
presence of blocked memory can indeed be something that needs to be worked through, 
hence the call by many for “the healing of memories.”30 Ricoeur makes a further important 
remark about “symbolic wounds” that requires serious consideration, especially in post-conflict 
situations: “What we celebrate under the title of founding events are, essentially, acts of 
violence legitimated after the fact by a precarious state of right. What was glory for some was 
humiliation for other. In this way, symbolic wounds calling for healing are stored in the archives 
27  Yerushalmi, Y H 1982, Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press), 5. 
28  Booth, W J 2006, Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press), ix.
29  Ricoeur also refers in his phenomenology of memory – before turning to natural memory – to the abuses 
of what he calls “artificial memory.” See Memory, History, Forgetting, 58-68. 
30  For some important perspectives engaging South African contexts, see the essays by an interdisciplinary 
team of scholars collected in Goboda-Madikizela, P and Van der Merwe, C 2009, Memory, Narrative 
and Forgiveness: Perspectives on the Unfinished Journeys of the Past (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge 
Scholars Press). As the “Preface” notes, this collection “explores the relation between trauma and 
memory, and the complex, interconnected issues of trauma and narrative (testimonial and literary). 
It examines transgenerational trauma, memory as the basis for dialogue and reconciliation in divided 
societies, memorialisation and the changing role of memory in the aftermath of mass trauma, mourning 
and the potential of forgiveness to heal the enduring effects of mass trauma” (xi). For a valuable earlier 
collections of essays that includes some theological and ethical perspectives, see Botman, H R and 
Peterson (eds.), R M 1996, To Remember and to Heal: Theological and Psychological Reflections 
on Truth and Reconciliation (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau). For an important recent publication 
on dealing with the past in an intercultural context, see Diawara, M, Lategan, B, and Rüsen, J 2010, 
Historical Memory in Africa: Dealing with the past, Reaching for the future in an intercultural context 
(New York: Berghahn Books). 
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of the collective memory.”31 
Ricoeur places on the practical level – the level of manipulated or instrumentalised memory 
– the important problem of memory and (personal and collective) identity. He is especially 
interested in the way in which memory is mobilised in the service of the quest and demand for 
identity. As he writes elsewhere, “the diseases of memory are basically diseases of identity.”32 
The fragility or vulnerability of memory is therefore interconnected with the fragility of identity. 
In addition to the abuses of blocked and manipulated memory, Ricoeur discusses possible 
abuses on an ethico-political level as he engages the emotional topic of the alleged “duty to 
remember.” For Ricoeur it may even be that this duty to remember “constitutes, at one and the 
same time, the epitome of good use and of abuse in the exercise of memory.”33 In this context 
Ricoeur brings the notion of justice into play: “The duty of memory is the duty to do justice, 
through memory, to an other than the self.”34 Here, as in Ricoeur’s project as a whole, some 
clear ethical concerns presents themselves.
Moreover, we should note that Ricoeur does not approach memory merely from the 
viewpoint of its deficiencies, but also in the light of its capacities.35 For our reference to the 
past we have no other resource than memory itself. Consequently, Ricoeur emphasises that 
our acknowledgement of the unreliability of memory must be interwoven with the admission 
that memory is our one and only resource to signify the past character of what we declare we 
remember. The deficiencies of memory should thus not be viewed from the outset as pathological 
and dysfunctional, “but as the shadowy underside of the bright region of memory.”36 As Ricoeur 
states: “To put it bluntly, we have nothing better than memory to signify that something has 
taken place, has occurred, has happened before we declare that we remember it.”37 This 
implies, in our view, that any reflection on the relationship between memory and history should 
not minimise the tension brought to the relationship by a strong emphasis on memory as an 
essential category in the attempt to offer a reliable representation of the past.
The reality of the historical past
One can say that Ricoeur views memory with both suspicion and trust. The abuses of memory 
are clearly acknowledged, but the deficiencies of memory are not a reason to view memory as 
a mere province of history or to take refuge in the dream of historical objectivity. The objectivist 
historical mentality with its over-confident claims regarding value-free, dispassionate and 
“objective” accounts of the past, on the basis of an inflated confidence in the power of primary 
31  Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 79.
32  Ricoeur, P, “Memory and Forgetting” in Kearney, R & Dooley, M (eds), Questioning Ethics: 
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1999), 7.
33  Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 87.
34  Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 89.
35  The themes of fallibility and capability are important for Ricoeur’s philosophical project. See, for 
instance, his earlier work Fallible Man (Chicago: Regnery, 1965). In an interview with Sorin Antohi, 
Ricoeur refers to a move in his philosophical anthropology from fallibility to capability: “In the 
intermediate book between Memory, History, Forgetting and Time and Narrative, namely, Oneself as 
Another, the central concept is man as he is able and capable. What man can do: I can speak, I can 
narrate, I can act, I can feel responsible … therefore my last book on memory, history and forgetting 
is related not to fallible man but to capable man, this is to say that man is capable of making memory 
and making history” (Ricoeur, P & Antohi, S, “Memory, history, forgiveness: A dialogue between 
Paul Ricoeur and Sorin Antohi.” Janus Head 2005: 8/1, 17). See also Mechteld Jansen’s chapter on 
“Fragiliteit: Breekbaarheid en Kwetsbaarheid” in Jansen, M M 2002, Talen naar God: Wegwijzers bij 
Paul Ricoeur (Dronten: Uitgeverij Narratio), 222-273.
36  Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 21.
37  Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 21.
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sources to provide access to the past, should be resisted. While one must rightly challenge a 
certain form of objectivist historiography, since there is no way around subjectivity, we should 
remember too – as Paul Ricoeur has already argued in his early essay “Objectivity and Subjectivity 
in History” – that “there is good and bad subjectivity and we expect the very exercise of the 
historian’s craft to decide between them.”38 Although the debate surrounding objectivity in 
history can easily become stale, it is important to keep in mind that the “sources” do not tell the 
complete story and even the best archives offer us a limited window onto the past.39 Access to 
archives and primary sources does not absolve us from the task of interpreting the sources and 
placing them within meaningful interpretive frameworks and narrative configurations. 
In Memory, History, Forgetting Ricoeur – who has a stake in the autonomy of historical 
knowledge in relation to what he calls “the mnemonic phenomenon”40 – engages the non-
chronological movement from the archive to historiography (as the writing of history) as he 
seeks to provide a coherent epistemology of history. In the process he embarks on an extensive 
description of what he calls, following Michel de Certeau, “the historiographical operation.”41 
Without giving a detailed discussion here,42 we can mention that Ricoeur describes the 
historiographical operation as consisting of three phases. These three phases are not seen by him 
as three distinct chronological stages, but as “methodological moments, interwoven with one 
another.”43 The first phase of the historiographical operation (the documentary phase) ranges 
from the reports by eyewitnesses to the constituting of archives, which aims at establishing 
documentary proof. But these documents in the archives are themselves derived from the 
testimony of memories. Thus history starts with testimony, and testimonies are collected, 
preserved and consulted in the archive. Towards the end of his discussion of the documentary 
phase, Ricoeur asks rhetorically whether documentary proof is more remedy than poison for 
the constitutive weakness of testimony. This question points to the need for the explanation/
understanding phase,44 since there are no documents produced or consulted without some 
prior questions, and no questions are generated without an explanatory project. The third phase 
that Ricoeur discusses in his portrayal of the historiographical operation is that of the historian’s 
representation in written form. To mark the specificity of the third phase, Ricoeur prefers not 
to speak of historiography, but of literary or scriptural representation. Such representation 
38  Ricoeur, P, History and Truth (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1965), 22. For Ricoeur 
“subjectivity” does not merely refer to the historian’s subjectivity, but also to the idea that “the object of 
history is the human subject itself” (40).
39  For a critical engagement with the notion of “the archive” see Derrida, J, Archive Fever: A Freudian 
Impression (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Cf. also Vosloo, R R. “Archiving Otherwise: 
Some Remarks on Memory and Historical Responsibility”. Studia Historae Ecclesiasticae XXXI/2, 2005: 
379-399. 
40  Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 136.
41  Ricoeur acknowledges that his use of the term “historiographical operation” has been infl uenced by 
Michel de Certeau’s contribution to the project edited by Jacques le Goff and Pierre Nora under the title 
Faire de l’histoire. See Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 136. For a revised version of De Certeau’s 
essay, see De Certeau, M, The Writing of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 56-113. 
42  For a more extended discussion of Ricoeur’s description of “the historiographical operation,” see Vosloo, 
R R 2011, “The writing of history as remedy or poison? Some Remarks on Paul Ricoeur’s Reflection 
on Memory, Identity and ‘the historiographical operation’” in Jonker, L (ed.) 2011, Texts, Contexts, 
Readings: Explorations into Historiography and Identity Negotiation in Persian Period Jehud (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck Verlag), 11-30.
43  Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 137. 
44  Ricoeur refers to the second phase of the historical operation as the explanation/understanding phase, 
because he wants to challenge the dichotomy that is often created between explanation and understanding 
(as famously posed by Dilthey in the nineteenth century).
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must understand itself as “standing for” (représentance, the German Darstellung), thus it has 
intentionality. This intended “something” makes history the learned heir of memory. In this 
process of intentional representation, narrative form plays an important role. Ricoeur also 
acknowledges the rhetorical aspect of staging a narrative. Ricoeur is also interested in the 
confrontation between historical and fictional narrative. What is at stake for Ricoeur in his 
discussion of the respective relationships between representation and narrative, representation 
and rhetoric, and representation and fiction, is the capacity of historical discourse to represent 
the past. This intentional aim, the “standing for,” of history is important as it indicates the 
expectation that historical knowledge constitutes attempted reconstructions of past events. 
This is the contract between the writer and the reader. Unlike the contract between a writer of 
fiction and his or her reader, the author and the reader of a historical text “agree that it will deal 
with situations, events, connections and characters who once really existed, that is, before the 
narrative of them is put together.”45 
The brief discussion above points to Ricoeur’s affirmation of what can be called, following 
the title of his “Aquinas lecture” (1984), “the reality of the historical past.”46 Although Ricoeur 
affirms the role of narrative in both historical-scholarly and literary representations of the past, 
the difference between history and fiction should be respected. This implies, among other 
things, that critical history (via a coherent and responsible epistemology) has a role to play 
alongside, and sometimes in conflict with, memory. While memory is the matrix of history, it is 
not the master of history. The “autonomy” of history should be acknowledged. At the same time 
the affirmation that history seeks to represent the “reality” of the past should not lead to the 
type of over-confidence that does not duly respect the mystery or the uncanniness of the past. 
The messy and recalcitrant nature of the past ought to challenge any attempt that presumes to 
equate our historical representations with the past. The strangeness of the past should keep 
haunting history, with historians even underlining this strangeness on a more conscious level 
(also as they engage contexts marked and scarred by historical injustice). In this regard a remark 
in the book There was this goat comes to mind. Grappling with the irregular and marginalised 
testimony of Mrs Konile before the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the 
authors comment: “These ‘strange’ testimonies underline the importance of refraining from 
“un-strange-ing’ the strange – to allow it to be strange – but within its original logical and 
coherent context. Accommodation of ‘strangeness’ would keep the spaces of tolerance open for 
many people emerging from contexts of conflict and estrangement.”47
CONCLUSION: THE RECEPTION OF MEMORY TAUGHT BY HISTORY, AND THE WITNESS TO 
JUSTICE
An analysis of Ricoeur’s discussion of the relationship between memory and history clearly 
reveals that he does not want to privilege any one of these modes of retrospection, but that 
he wants to affirm their dialectical relationship. Memory is not a province of history and history 
is not merely historicised memory. The convincing power of Memory, History, Forgetting lies 
in part in the way in which Ricoeur is able to maintain this tension within the context of the 
threats posed by our “being-in-time”-ness and forgetting. For any responsible historiographical 
project Ricoeur’s engagement with these themes hold much promise. The question can be 
asked, though, whether the relevance of Ricoeur’s treatment of memory, history and forgetting 
stretches beyond the writing of history.
45  Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, 275.
46  Cf. Ricoeur, The Reality of the Historical Past (1984).
47  Krog, Mpolweni, Ratele, There was this goat, 100.
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With this question in mind, a lecture Ricoeur presented in English under the title “Memory, 
history, oblivion” in March 2003 at a conference on “Haunting Memories? History in Europe after 
Authoritarianism” at the Central European University in Budapest makes for interesting reading. 
In this lecture Ricoeur engages critically with his own focus in Memory, History, Forgetting on 
the writing of history (in line with the lexicon definition of historiography). In Ricoeur’s words:
“What I am proposing today is a shift in the prevailing standpoint, a shift from writing to 
reading, or, to put it in broader terms, from the literary elaboration of the historical work to 
its reception, either private or public, along the lines of a hermeneutics of reception. This 
shift would give an opportunity to extract from their linear treatment in the book some 
problems which clearly concern the reception of history rather than the writing of history 
and to emphasize them. The issues at stake clearly concern memory, no longer as a mere 
matrix of history, but as the reappropriation of the historical past by a memory taught by 
history and often wounded by history.”48
Ricoeur then elaborates on what he views as the most interesting consequences of this shift 
concerning the relationship between memory and history. This relationship is now treated not 
in a linear but in a circular way, with memory now appearing twice in the course of the analysis, 
first as the matrix of history (from the standpoint of history-writing), and later as the channel of 
the reappropriation of the historical past. This is not to disregard the linear account in Memory, 
History, Forgetting, since without this movement no reappropriation of the past is possible. 
However, Ricoeur points to the importance of memory as the reception of the historical past. 
This focus on memory as the reception of the historical past has some important implications. 
In closing I would like to point to the fact that, among other things, it reminds us that questions 
regarding the relationship between memory and history cannot be separated from certain 
ethical concerns, hence the need for an ethics of memory and history.49 Some important 
questions therefore present themselves, such as: Whose memories of the past are remembered 
and privileged? Are those recalling the memories or witnesses of the past today engaging those 
memories through history (i.e. through a responsible historical epistemology and hermeneutic)? 
Are those witnesses today who are receiving or reappropriating memories from the past 
themselves witnessing for justice? With whom – and in which communities and as part of which 
tradition – are we grappling with our interwoven and often contested constructions of the past?
In our Introduction we referred to Krog, Molweni and Ratele’s investigation of the testimony 
of Notrose Nobomvu Konile, who through her seemingly incoherent testimony occupied a 
specific space in documented history (with her name not included in the index of the Truth 
Commission’s website and whose name is misspelt in the official transcriptions). Yet they 
witness to her memory by trying “to understand this unmentioned, incorrectly ID-ed, misspelt, 
incoherently testifying, translated and carelessly transcribed woman.”50 This reminds us that we 
should be sensitive to the way in which representations of the past have led to exclusion and 
victimisation. As Ricoeur comments: “We need, therefore, a kind of parallel history of, let us say, 
victimisation, which would counter the history of success and victory. To memorise the victims of 
history – the sufferers, the humiliated, the forgotten – should be a task for all of us.”51 
In our continual reflection on the relationship between memory and history, we are therefore 
continually challenged to narrate the historical past other-wise. In this process we would do well 
48  Ricoeur, P, “Memory, history, oblivion”. See www.fondsricoeur.fr, 1,2. 
49  See, for instance, Wyshogrod, E, An Ethics of Remembering: History, Heterology, and the Nameless 
Others (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Margalit, A, The Ethics of Memory (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2002); Carr, D, Flynn, R T and Makkreel, R, The Ethics of History (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2004).
50  Krog, Mpolweni, Ratele, There was this goat, 4.
51  Kearney and Dooley, Questioning Ethics, 10,11.
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to remember the words of Isak Dinesen that Hannah Arendt uses at the beginning of the chapter 
on “Action” in The Human Condition (and that Ricoeur is also fond of quoting): “All sorrows can 
be borne if you put them into a story or tell a story about them.”52
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